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Overview of Bicameral Legislatures’ Potential Impact on the Executive Selection Process
KYLE KOPCHAK
INTRODUCTION
Bicameral legislature is a common constitutional design model, with bicameral legislatures
making up roughly 41 percent of all legislatures worldwide.1 As of April 2014, 79 bicameral and
113 unicameral systems were recorded in the database of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.2 In
general, “bicameralism is more common in federal, large, and presidential states, while
unicameralism is more common in unitary, small, parliamentary ones”.3 Bicameral systems
operate two legislative chambers, both of which play a role in drafting and passing national
legislation.4 However, each house often fulfills a unique role in the legislative process and is
usually elected by different methods.5 Proponents of bicameral legislatures argue that a second
chamber aids the separation of power by avoiding the risk of abuse that can occur by concentrating
power in a single body while simultaneously enhancing democracy by drawing on a broader and
more diversified base.6
Most bicameral legislatures are created to operate outside of the executive branch as a
function of the separation of power, but some have influence over selecting a state’s executives.
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This paper will evaluate several bicameral legislatures to determine how the upper chamber and
lower chamber can contribute to choosing a nation’s executive. Very few countries operate
systems that allow both chambers significant influence in selecting a nation’s executive, and
currently, there is no country that solely allows its upper chamber to select an executive. Moreover,
most systems of government limit their upper chamber’s ability to select their nation’s head of
government. Ideally, by incorporating the upper chamber into the executive appointment process,
a nation could benefit from the increased representation and experience of an upper chamber’s
legislators.
Moreover, as scholars such as Juan Linz point out, politically, ethnically, or religiously
divided societies that operate winner-take-all executive selection processes often leave vulnerable
minority groups mostly unrepresented in the executive branch.7 While parliamentary elections can
create multi-party coalition governments, parliamentary elections are just as likely to result in one
dominant party winning an absolute majority, which remains problematic for minority groups
within the country. By allowing each chamber to appoint an executive, the effects of the winnertake-all executive election may be mitigated by providing minority groups additional opportunities
to win executive representation and ultimately forcing cooperation between opposing political
parties in power.
This paper will first briefly examine bicameral chambers and address the benefits of
allowing an upper chamber to select an executive. Next, it will highlight several countries that
allow the upper house input in selecting executives to demonstrate how these upper chambers
contribute to that process. I organized each of my sample countries into five categories; 1) The
U.S. Contingent Election Model; 2) the German model; 3) the National-Regional model; 4) the
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Federal Chambers Model; 5) and the Swiss Bicameral Model. Finally, the paper will conclude by
discussing several benefits of allowing upper chambers to participate in the executive selection
process while simultaneously addressing the structural challenges that may limit their beneficial
impact on the selection process.
I.

WHY BICAMERAL SYSTEMS

Bicameral systems operate two legislative chambers, both of which play a role in drafting
and passing national legislation.8 Historically, the upper chamber in bicameral legislatures has not
played a significant role in appointing a state’s executive. In most parliamentary systems, a
nation’s lower chamber, or popularly elected chamber, retains the authority to appoint the prime
minister or cast a vote of no confidence. In contrast, upper chambers, which are often appointed
or elected indirectly, have little to no influence in appointing national executives. Upper chambers
provide representation to communities of interest that receive less representation in the lower
chamber. Each house often fulfills a unique role in the legislative process and is usually elected
by different methods.9 Proponents of bicameral legislatures argue that a second chamber aids the
separation of power by avoiding the risk of abuse that can occur by concentrating power into a
single body while simultaneously enhancing democracy by drawing on a broader and more
diversified base.10
In order to successfully check each chamber’s power, and often other branches of
government, each chamber in a bicameral legislature serves a different purpose. Thus, there must
be “a degree of difference between [each chambers’] roles and … powers,” otherwise one chamber
is likely to “reinforce the majority power that controls the lower chamber”.11 In most bicameral
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systems, the lower chamber is popularly elected and primarily represents a state’s population while
simultaneously serving as the primary mechanism in making legislative decisions 12 such as
“taxation … and votes of confidence”.13 In contrast, the upper chamber, which has representatives
that are “usually appointed or elected indirectly- [has] fewer … legislative powers.”14 Still, the
upper chamber plays a vital role in providing additional representation and political checks.
“First, the second (or upper) [chamber] of a federal legislature” often represents specific
regions or populations of the country, “and each state often receives equal representation
regardless of population or territory size.”15 This concept is illustrated by institutions such as the
United States Senate or South Africa’s National Council of Provinces.16 Additionally, some
countries have used their upper chamber to represent certain ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural
groups or civil societies.17 Malawi serves as an example of an ethnic-centric upper house. Malawi’s
constitution provides for thirty-two of the eighty senators to be chosen by elected senators from a
list of candidates nominated by ethnic minorities. By integrating ethnic group representation into
the upper chamber, state legislatures can ensure adequate representation of minority interests and
viewpoints.18 Outside of ethnic representation, upper chambers can provide representation for
regional interests. For example, the German Bundesrat, the upper chamber, allows all seventeen
of Germany’s federal states to participate directly in the federal government’s decisions, allowing
for increased levels of regional representation.19
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Bicameral legislatures often improve the quality of legislation and the overall stability of
the legislative process.20 Specifically, the upper chamber serves as a chamber of review by slowing
down decisions made in the lower chamber.21 The presence of an upper chamber delays the
legislative procedure and allows the expression of public sentiments on policy issues.22 In
countries such as the United States and Australia, legislation must pass both chambers before it
can be signed into law. Moreover, Australia demonstrates that by incorporating a proportional
representation system of voting to elect senators, the upper chamber will likely elect a high number
of non–government senators that can “use their combined voting power to reject… government
legislation” or “scrutinise the way laws and policies are administered by ministers and public
servants.”23
It is important to reemphasize the need for the upper chamber to be elected or appointed
differently from the lower chamber because a different appointment process allows the upper
chamber to represent additional interests. For example, lower chambers often represent the
electorate’s will, but if a piece of legislation is derived from a populist agenda, it is useful to have
a second chamber evaluate the legislation from a different perspective. Moreover, upper chambers
often contain individuals with specific policy expertise who are better positioned to analyze
potential legislation and its impact on various groups throughout the country. Thus, by providing
a second opinion on proposed legislation, upper chambers work to check the lower chamber’s
power, which supports the overall purpose of creating a bicameral legislature.

Jeannette Money and George Tsebelis, Cicero’s Puzzle: Upper House Power in Comparative Perspective, 13 Int'l
Pol. Sci. Rev.,25, 27 (1992), https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/webbkeane/wpcontent/uploads/sites/246/2015/03/cicero_s_puzzle_1992_ipsr.pdf.
21
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22
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23
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20
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Finally, the upper chamber is in a strong position to scrutinize the executive. The executive
and legislative branches in parliamentary systems are placed in constant tension, with each branch
able to dispose of the other through a vote of no confidence or new elections.24 However, the upper
chamber typically exists as its own entity in that the prime minister cannot disband it. Therefore,
the upper chambers are more likely to act independently from the executive, and they “therefore
provide an important forum for parliamentary scrutiny and strengthening parliament’s overall
control over the government.”25 For example, through the practice of question time, upper
chambers in states such as the United Kingdom can question policy decisions made by the prime
minister and her cabinet.26
In a presidential system, an upper chamber such as the United States Senate can put
political pressure on the president through the chambers’ ability to approve or block judicial and
executive appointments. The U.S. Constitution also tasks the Senate with holding impeachment
trials and voting whether to impeach the president.27 Similarly, in Germany, the Bundesrat holds
the authority to impeach the president for a violation of the Basic Law. 28 However, the practical
influence and impact of an upper house depend less on its formal legislative powers and “more on
the substance of public support for its role in the national legislative system, reflecting the broader
political and public legitimacy attached to its distinctive scheme of representation.”29 Thus, upper
chambers that are viewed as illegitimate or that lack public support will find it more challenging
to check proposed legislation or executives.
II.

BICAMERAL LEGISLATURES THAT ASSIST IN SELECTING AN EXECUTIVE
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Next, this paper will examine several bicameral legislatures that allow upper chambers to
influence the selection of their executives. There is no current constitutional system that allows a
nation’s upper and lower houses to select an executive. There is also no system that vests the upper
chamber with the sole authority to select the nation’s head of state. Systems that grant their nation’s
upper chamber influence in choosing an executive often require both the upper and lower chamber
to sit for a joint session or use an electoral college method.
For this paper, I created five categories to distinguish different systems that allow the upper
chamber to influence the executive selection process. These categories are 1) The U.S. Contingent
Election Model; 2) the German model; 3) the National-Regional model; 4) and the Federal
Chambers Model; 5) and the Swiss Bicameral Model. Each of these categories operate in their
own unique manner. However, one common theme across each of these categories is that the head
of State, which the upper chamber has some influence in electing, remains relatively week
compared to the head of government. In most cases, the head of state places a ceremonial role,
while the head of government wields a majority of the governing power.
In all of these countries, the president plays a ceremonial role. Despite the limitations on
executive power, the five categories to distinguish different systems that allow the upper chamber
to influence the executive selection process could play a salient role in future constitutions.
The first category is the U.S. Contingent Election Model, which only occurs in the event
of a tie in the American electoral college, but it is the closest system to an upper and lower chamber
each choosing an executive. The German model is the next category, and it is unique because the
upper chamber and regional representative’s make-up the presidential electoral college. The next
category is the National-Regional model, which allows both federal chambers and regional
representational bodies to participate in the presidential electoral college. The final category is the

7

Federal Chambers Model, which requires both national chambers to sit in a joint session and elect
a president.
A. The U.S. Contingent Election Model
While no countries currently operate a system in which the upper chamber selects the head
of state and the lower chamber elects the head of government, the drafters of the United States
presidential selection processes incorporated a similar system for selecting the President and Vice
President. Initially, under Article Two of the U.S. Constitution, presidential electors cast votes for
two different candidates. A candidate would win the presidency by receiving a majority of the
electoral votes, and the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes would become the
vice-president. 30
However, a problem occurred in the presidential election of 1800. Aaron Burr and Thomas
Jefferson received the same number of electoral votes, resulting in a contingent election. 31 A
contingent election is the procedure used to elect the president in the event that no candidate wins
an absolute majority of votes in the Electoral College.32 Thus, under Article Two, Section 1, Clause
3 of the United States Constitution, the United States House of Representatives was required to
decide the election by a special vote. In a contingent election, the House doesn’t cast its votes in
its traditional manner. Rather, each state delegation must cast its vote en bloc, with each state
receiving just a single vote, allotted to the candidate who receives majority support in the
delegation. Thus, a candidate must receive an absolute majority of state-delegation votes to win
the election. As the U.S. has fifty states, a candidate must receive votes from at least twenty-six

30

Thomas H. Neale, CRS Report R40504, Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress:
Perspectives and Contemporary Analysis, 1 (Cong. Research Serv. Oct. 6, 2020)
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31
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state delegations.33 With the help of Alexander Hamilton, Jefferson won the contingent election
on the 36th ballot seven days later.34
In response to the turmoil caused by the election of 1800, Congress passed the Twelfth
Amendment, requiring electors to cast two distinct votes: one for the president and another for the
vice president.35 In the event of an electoral tie for the president, the House selects and votes for
one of the three candidates who received the most electoral votes. In the event of an electoral tie
for the vice president, the Senate selects one of the two candidates who received the most electoral
votes.36 By instituting this framework, Congress aimed to check the power of the popularly elected
house of representatives and prevent further conflicted elections. The Twelfth Amendment has
only been used twice since its implementation. First, the election of 1824 led to a special
congressional election victory of John Quincy Adams, despite Andrew Jackson carrying the
popular vote and a plurality of the electoral votes.37 In contrast, the Senate has only exercised its
power to appoint a vice president once.38 In the election of 1836, Martin Van Buren was elected
president, but Kentucky’s former Democratic senator Richard M. Johnson fell one electoral vote
short of a majority among four vice-presidential candidates. Johnson successfully won the Senate’s
special election, and broke fourteen tied votes while serving as the president of the Senate.
The contemporary United States is composed of an array of political beliefs that stretch
across the political spectrum. While the United States has historically experienced lower levels of
political violence, recent events have illustrated that the country’s democracy may not be as stable
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as once thought. Moreover, the concept of contingent voting creates a small but real opportunity
that the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate could select executives for opposing political
parties. Thus, this raises question of how the U.S. executive branch would function in a scenario
that would resemble something similar to political cohabitation. Cohabitation occurs typically in
a semi-presidential system when the president is from a different political party than the prime
minister.39 In other words, two opposing political parties hold the top two executive positions.40
While the U.S. President is clearly vested with executive authority in the American system, a Vice
President from an opposing political party would be in a position to actively undermine the
President’s ability to implement his legislative agenda.
The U.S. contingent election model demonstrates the efforts of the American founding
fathers to incorporate elements of bicameralism into the executive selection process. For example,
by allowing the Senate to select the Vice President, the Twelfth Amendment further embraces the
bicameral principle of providing a further democratic check on the power of the lower house.
Moreover, the U.S. Senate was created to protect the rights of individual states and safeguard
minority opinion.41 Specially, the Senate provides strong geographical representation through its
equal number of seats distributed per state. Thus, the Twelfth Amendment enables different
principles of representation to be applied to the Vice President selection process through
geographic representation. Ultimately, the American system of contingent voting demonstrates a
structural system in which the upper and lower chamber of a bicameral system could elect a

39
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(2015).
40
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nation’s leading executives. Going forward, I will evaluate several hybrid structures that provide
upper chambers with some level of influence in electing one of their nation’s executives.
B. Germanic Model
Under the German model, a nation elects its president by forming an election convention
consisting of members of the federal legislature or parliament and representatives from all the state
parliaments. Thus, this approach allows national and local politicians to select the president. In
Germany, the Federal Chancellor is elected by the Bundestag, and the Federal Convention elects
the Federal President. The Federal Convention consists of the Bundestag and an equal number of
members elected by the parliaments of the Länder.42 The Länder consists of representatives from
the state parliament. The election’s details are governed by the Presidential Election Act, which is
based on Article 54 (7) of the Basic Law.43 Each state’s population determines the number of
representatives each Länder is allowed to send to the convention.44 The Land parliaments elect the
representatives of the Länder in line with the principles of proportional representation.45 Typically,
the members of the Federal Convention are members of the parliaments of the Länder, but local
politicians and figures from other areas of public life may also be elected.46
Germany’s Federal Presidential election process is unique because the German Federal
upper chamber members, the Bundesrat, do not participate in the presidential appointment
processes. However, Germany’s 16 states are still represented in the election process through the
appointment of representatives of the state parliament. Each state delegation in the Bundesrat
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represents its regional government, reflecting the political makeup of the ruling majority or
plurality of each state legislature.47 Since the German state legislatures are responsible for
appointing each states’ representatives to participate in the Federal Convention, the ideology of
the representatives should mirror those of the states’ representatives in the Bundesrat. While the
Bundesrat does not elect the Federal President, it can impeach the President under Article 61 of
the German constitution.48 If the Federal President is incapacitated, the Federal President’s powers
are assumed by the Bundesrat’s President.49
Similar to most upper chambers in a bicameral system, the Bundesrat serves to check the
lower house and the executive’s power. Evidence of the Bundesrat’s ability to impeach the Federal
President demonstrates the power granted to a bicameral chamber to check an executive’s actions.
Additionally, members of the Bundesrat tend to be state government ministers who spend most of
their time in their state capitals and are experienced bureaucrats.50 As a result, the Bundesrat
protects states’ rights to participate within the framework laid out in the constitution while
simultaneously allowing Germany’s federal government to draw on the political-administrative
experience of the states.51 By allowing state legislatures to contribute to the Presidential
appointment processes, the state legislatures can use their unique political and administrative
experience to select a capable President. Finally, by allowing members of the Länder’s to
participate in choosing a Federal President, the German constitution provides local representatives
influence on the federal level. State legislatures appointing members of the general public to
represent their state in the Federal Convention encourages the idea that the public at large has some

47
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say in the process. Ultimately, by including appointed representatives from the German states, the
German constitution increases the Länder’s willingness to work with the federal legislature
because the states have legislative input in the federal government.
C. National-Regional Model
Countries that fall under the National-Regional Model are bicameral legislature that use
their upper chamber representatives to aid in appointing one of the nation’s executives. Under the
National-Regional Model, both chambers of the federal legislature aid in selecting the president,
as well as state legislatures or regional councils. Thus, the National-Regional Model incorporates
a multitude of perspectives from different regional, ethnic, or religious groups. Ideally, the
diversity of perspectives will result in the election of an executive who governs with the interests
of all a nation’s minority groups.
D. Indian Model
India’s presidential appointment process serves as a contemporary example of a bicameral
legislature that uses its upper chamber representatives to aid in appointing one of the nation’s
executives. It is similar to the German presidential process in that members of the state legislatures
participate in the process, but it differs in that members of the Indian upper federal chamber also
cast a vote for the President. The Indian President is elected for a five-year term by an electoral
college consisting of the elected members of both houses of parliament and the elected members
of the states and territories’ legislative assemblies.52 Once the office of the President becomes
vacant, the new President is chosen by an electoral college consisting of the elected members of
both houses of parliament (M.P.s), the elected members of the State Legislative Assemblies
(Vidhan Sabha) of all States, and the elected members of the legislative assemblies (MLAs) of
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union territories with legislatures, i.e., National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi, Jammu and
Kashmir, and Puducherry.53
The election is held according to proportional representation (PR) through the single
transferable vote (STV) method.54 In 2017, the electoral college comprised 776 MPs and 4,120
MLAs.55 The electoral college is created so that the total weight of MPs and those of MLAs is
roughly equal and that the voting power of states and territories are proportional to their population.
Thus, members of the electoral college could cast 1,098,903 votes, with the winning candidate
needing 549,452 votes to win.56
It is challenging to analyze the qualities of bicameralism that may contribute to India’s
upper house, the Rajya Sabha, selecting the country’s President because of the involvement of the
state legislatures. The presidential election process is a more extensive process than electing the
prime minister, who is also elected indirectly by the federal parliament (Lok Sabha) members only.
In contrast, the President is the constitutional head of state with duties to protect, defend, and
preserve the constitution and the rule of law. The participation of state and territory assemblies in
the presidential election is designed to ensure that the President is selected as the head of the nation
and not merely a direct representative of the majority party in parliament, thereby placing the office
above politics and making the incumbent a symbol of national unity.57 India is one of the most
diverse nations globally, so it is critical that there is universal acceptance of the appointment of
the Indian President.
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While India’s electoral college composition does not mirror a traditional bicameral
legislature, including the upper federal chamber and lower state legislatures, the electoral college
attempts to protect the same principles that traditional bicameralism does. For example, by
incorporating local legislatures into the appointment process, the Indian constitution limits the
power of the federal lower chamber to elect both of India’s executives. The perception of allowing
state legislatures to participate in the presidential appointment process likely increases overall
public trust in the process because a coalition of national parties is not appointing the president.
Instead, the nation as a whole has some influence over who becomes the nation’s next president.
Moreover, the representatives of the Indian upper chamber are elected by the state and union
territories, which further increases the diversity of the upper chamber and gives certain minority
groups additional representation.58
E. Italian Model
The Italian Presidential appointment process is another example of how upper chambers
can influence a nation’s executive appointment procedure. The Italian presidential election is
similar to the Indian election in that the electoral college consists of both houses of the national
legislature and some members of regional councils. The electoral college consists of 630 deputies,
315 Senators, and 58 regional representatives.59 In total, the electoral college is made-up of 1,000
members.60 The election is held by a secret ballot, with a two-thirds vote required to elect the
President within the first three rounds and a simple majority after any additional rounds.61 The
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President’s term lasts seven years, which prevents any President from being reelected by the same
houses, which hold elections every five years.62
The Italian Senate was created to represent the different regions of the country, but in
practice, the only real difference between the two chambers is the age recruitment to be a candidate
and electorate. The 630 deputies, who must be at least 25 years of age, are elected by all Italian
citizens over 18 years of age, and the 315 elected senators must be at least 40 years of age, and
their electors must be over 25.63 One could argue that the Senate better represents the concerns of
an older electorate, but six years does not appear to be a significant difference. Moreover, both
chambers are elected in a similar manner, defeating one of the primary purposes of operating a
bicameral system. Thus, while the Italian upper chamber does have influence in selecting the
President, the nature of Italy’s bicameral legislature does not allow the benefits of an upper
chamber to be utilized in the selection of an executive.
F. Nepalese Model
The Nepalis Monarchy was abolished on May 28, 2008, by the country's first Constituent
Assembly.64 The country has since transitioned to a Federal Parliamentary Republic. The President
of Nepal is indirectly elected every five years by an electoral college comprised of the two houses
of the Federal Parliament of Nepal and the provincial assemblies of each of Nepal's seven
provinces, who themselves are all directly elected.65 Article 70 of the Nepalis constitution states
that the election of the President and Vice President should be conducted in a manner to represent
different genders and/or communities to increase representation for minority groups.66
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Each chamber of the Federal Parliament and provincial assemblies receives a difference of
weightage in voting. In 2018, there were 884 members, including 275 members of the House of
Representatives (Lower House), 59 members of the National Assembly (Upper House), and 550
members of seven state assemblies voting to determine who would become President. 67 The
Ministry of Law set that a vote cast by a member of the federal Parliament, including both upper
and lower houses, will have the weight of 79 votes, whereas the vote cast by a member of the state
assembly will have the weight of 48 votes. Thus, the electoral college will have 52,786 electoral
votes.68 Finally, the candidate that receives the most electoral votes becomes President.
The primary function of Nepal's National Assembly brings state issues to the attention of
the national government.69 In general, the National Assembly has a limited role in financial bills,
and the chamber lacks numbers to display strength in a joint sitting vote.70 The strength of the
chamber is the representation it provides to regional states and minority groups, similar to the
positive traits of bicameralism. The upper chamber’s strong state representation stems from the
chamber's composition of eight members from each state.71 Each state's delegation is elected by
an electoral college comprised of members from the state's Provincial Assembly and chairpersons
and vice-chairpersons of Village councils and Mayors and Deputy Mayors of Municipal councils.72
Moreover, Nepal's constitution increases the diversity of each regional delegation by requiring
states to include at least three women, one Dalit, one person with a disability, or a member of a
minority group.73 Thus, by incorporating Nepal’s National Assembly into the presidential selection
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process, the country has increased the overall gender and ethnic diversity of those whose input
helps select the nation's two executives, which tracks with one of the overall goals of bicameralism.
G. Pakistani Model
An electoral college indirectly elects the Pakistani President for a five-year term.74 Similar
to the presidential election processes in India, Italy, and Nepal, the Pakistani President election
allows for both federal chambers and regional chambers to participate in the electoral process.
Under Article 41 of the Pakistani constitution, the President of Pakistan is elected in a special
session of the Parliament, consisting of both houses of Parliament (the Senate and National
Assembly) and the four provincial assemblies.75 In Pakistan’s 2018 presidential election, the
electoral college consisted of 706 voting lawmakers, including 104 national senators, 342 members
of the national assembly, and 260 members of the provincial assembly.76 In order to ensure equal
representation, all provincial assemblies are given 65 votes each in the electoral college.77
The Pakistani Senate was created to give equal representation to each of the country’s states
since the membership of the National Assembly was based on the population of each
province.78 Thus, similar to most bicameral chambers, the hope was that equal provincial
membership in the Senate would balance the provincial inequality in the National Assembly.79
Pakistan’s Senate consists of one hundred and four members elected indirectly by the Members of
the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies. Each of the nation’s four Provincial
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Assemblies elects fourteen Senators on general seats, four women, four technocrats, and one seat
reserved for non-Muslims.
Moreover, the members of the National Assembly from Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) elects eight Senators to represent FATAs, and all Members of National Assembly
elect two Senators on general seats, one woman and one technocrat to represent the Federal
Capital.80 Similar to Nepal, the Pakistani Senate’s diverse nature allows for an array of input from
minority groups throughout the country. By reserving seats for religious and gender minorities,
the constitution allows these groups to influence the presidential election.
The Pakistani Senate has the authority to scrutinize or check the president’s power through
impeachment. Under Article 47 of the Pakistani Constitution, either chamber of parliament can
initiate the impeachment process by charging the president of violating the constitution or gross
misconduct.81 The power to impeach the president serves as a unique power that many upper
houses do not have the authority to accomplish while simultaneously illustrating one benefit that
a bicameral system can have when implemented into an executive selection process.
H. Federal Chambers Model
Under the Federal Chambers Model, the executive election process does not incorporate
input from regional bodies. Instead, the upper and lower chamber select the president. This
selection process may occur by both chambers sitting in a joint session or forming an election
convention with members of both chambers. Ultimately, the defining characteristic is that regional
representative bodies are not included in the process.
I. Trinidadian and Tobagonian Model
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In 1976 Trinidad and Tobago transitioned to a republic and replaced their sovereign Queen
Elizabeth II with a president who wields nominal power. The President is elected every five years
by an electoral college, which is made up of the members of the Senate and House of
Representatives.82 The Senate consists of 31 members, 16 appointed by the President on the advice
of the Prime Minister, six on the opposition party leader's advice, and nine are chosen amongst
individuals prominent in economic or social affairs, under the President’s discretion.83 In contrast,
the House of Representatives consists of forty-one members elected by a simple majority from
single-member districts.84
Examining Trinidad and Tobago through the context of bicameralism raises an interesting
question about the role of the second chamber. The chamber does not represent any regional or
minority interest. Instead, it appears that the Senate was created with the idea that the President,
prime minister, and option leader can use the upper house to appoint individuals with unique skills
or expertise. These individuals likely use their personal knowledge to draft more effective
legislation or scrutinize bills proposed by the lower chamber. Considering the role of the Senate
in selecting the President through the context of bicameralism, ideally, senators will utilize their
political or professional experience to elect a president that they find competent to lead their
nation.
J. Ethiopian Model
The appointment of the Ethiopian president demonstrates how bicameral principles can be
adopted into a state’s executive selection process. Under article 70 of the Ethiopian Constitution,
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the nation’s lower chamber nominates the presidential candidate.85 Once the candidate is
nominated, the upper and lower chamber come together to approve the nominee’s candidacy.86
The Ethiopian House of Representatives consists of 547 members, while the House of the
Federation (upper chamber) has 110 members. The candidate must win two-thirds of the joint
chamber’s votes to become president.87
The Ethiopian House of the Federation comprises representatives from all of country’s
different “Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples.”88 State councils elect members of the upper
chamber.89 At first glance, it appears that the Ethiopian upper chamber is in a strong position to
influence the executive position with its diverse representation. For example, while the chamber
has no legislative powers, the House of Federation has broad constitutional powers. Specifically,
the upper chamber has authority over the Council of Constitutional Inquiry, an organization
designed to enforce the rights entrenched in the Ethiopian constitution.90 The diverse
representation of the upper chamber makes it a fair and equitable space to protect constitutional
rights. Ideally, by incorporating the Ethiopian upper chamber into the president’s selection process,
the chamber’s electors will select a candidate who believes in protecting constitutional rights.
However, by allowing the lower chamber of the Ethiopian parliament to choose the presidential
candidates, the upper chamber is severely limited in its ability to provide minority representation
to the executive selection process.
K. The Swiss Bicameral Model
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The creation of the Swiss federal state resulted in a bicameral legislature, which serves as
the national legislature for the nation’s 26 cantons or states. Switzerland’s federal upper chamber’s
influence in appointing the nation’s executives serves as a unique example of bicameralism at
work. What makes the Swiss model unique is that the two chambers in the Swiss parliament
“debate items of business on an equal footing and have the same competences and roles,” so the
upper and lower chamber fall outside the traditional definition of a bicameral legislature.91
Switzerland’s bicameral parliament is called the Federal Assembly, which is composed of
two chambers. The upper chamber is called the Council of States (46 seats, two seats per canton,
except for six cantons, which only have 1), and the National Council, which consists of 200 seats,
split between the cantons based on population, is known as the lower chamber.92 Switzerland’s
executive branch, known as the Federal Council, consists of seven members that head the federal
administration, which operates as a cabinet or collective presidency.93
Every four years, the United Federal Assembly comes together in a joint session with both
houses to elect the Federal Council. The election takes place by secret ballot in several rounds,
with severing members of the Federal Council standing for re-election in the order of their length
of time in office.94 After the third round, no new Council applications are accepted, and only
candidates who receive votes in the first two rounds can receive votes. If no candidate gets an
absolute majority (that is to say, more than half of the valid votes cast), the person with the fewest
votes is eliminated in the next round.95 This process is repeated until seven representatives receive
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an absolute majority of votes. Additionally, every December, the Federal Assembly meets in a
joint session to elect a new president and vice president of the confederation.96
The Federal Assembly also elects a vice president. By convention, the positions of
president and vice president rotate annually, each councilor thus becoming vice president and then
president while in office.97 Despite receiving the title of federal president, the chief executive has
no powers over and above his or her six colleagues but rather represents the country in international
affairs as a president might.98 Thus, under the Federal Constitution (Art. 177), the principle of
collegiality applies, in that the Federal Council reaches its decisions as a collegial body.99
As a result, the Swiss executive is one of the world’s most stable executives. Over the past
60 years, the Federal Council has been composed of the same political parties, with Switzerland’s
four main parties dividing the seven cabinet seats according to a set formula determined by their
strength at the ballot box.100 Changes to the council typically only occur when a representative
retires, and the member is almost always replaced by someone from their same party and often the
same linguistic group. Similar to how Switzerland’s regional and cultural groups have the ability
to influence federal legislation through the Council of States, these same states have the unique
ability to influence the appointment of federal executives. Ultimately, the Swiss model
encapsulates the ability of bicameral systems to provide a diverse array of ethnic and regional
groups influence over selecting a nation’s executive.
III.

MAJOR TAKEAWAYS
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Ultimately, examining the extent of bicameral legislatures' influence on the executive
selection process indicates several takeaways. First, while there is no contemporary example of a
lower and upper chamber selecting an executive, the U.S. contingent election model demonstrates
how the process might operate. However, the U.S. model is yet to demonstrate this process take
place within the last 200 years, which limits the usefulness of this example. Furthermore, few
nations operate an electoral system where both chambers contribute to the executive selection
process, so it is challenging to study this concept in various cultural and political contexts.
Moreover, the countries examined in this paper indicate that states that have incorporated
the upper chamber into their executive selection process have successfully increased the input of
regional and ethnic group representation in the appointment procedure. From Germany to Nepal,
it appears that almost every country that allowed their upper chamber influence in selecting one or
both executives wanted to provide additional geographical representation. The constitutions in
Germany, India, Italy, Nepal, and Pakistan incorporate state or regional legislative bodies, which
directly influence the presidential selection process.
The upper chambers in these nations have the opportunity to check the power of the lower
house through their limited ability to vote for one candidate and lobby against another during the
selection process.
Another benefit of incorporating the upper chamber into the executive selection process is
that countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, and Ethiopia have included additional representation for
minority ethnic groups and women by mandating that these groups have reserved seats in their
respective upper chambers. Mandatory seats for ethnic minority groups provide additional
representation for sections of the population that have historically been ignored. Finally, Trinidad
and Tobago serves as a prime example of an upper chamber that reserves seats for a handful of
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economic and policy experts to contribute to the political process. In bicameral legislatures,
representatives of upper chambers typically have unique skills or expertise to assist in drafting
laws. Ideally, by allowing upper chambers to select one or both of their executives, these economic
and policy experts will use their professional experience to select a competent president.
Despite the potential benefits of incorporating the upper chamber into the executive
selection process, there are significant limitations that may prevent the upper chamber from
strongly influencing the selection process. First, in every country evaluated, the president is
significantly weaker than the other executives, and in most cases, the president plays a ceremonial
role at best. In all of these countries, the lower chamber alone retains the authority to select the
prime minister, who retains most political power. Switzerland serves as the only example of an
upper chamber with some say in choosing the nation's president. However, there is no real
difference in the function of the Swiss upper chamber from the lower chamber, other than
geographical representation, which raises concerns about the role of the upper chamber. Thus, only
allowing a state's upper chamber to participate in selecting the nation's weaker executive is unlikely
to increase representation for minority groups in the executive branch because the primary
decision-maker will not need the support of members of the upper house to rise or stay in power.
Furthermore, the composition of the electoral college in all of these countries limits the
influence of the second chamber. For example, in Italy, the electoral college consists of 630
deputies, 315 senators, and 58 regional representatives.101[1] In order for a president to secure
victory, she only needs to secure two-thirds or 660 electoral votes. Thus, in a country where one
or two political parties dominate, minority representation in the upper chamber contributing to
electing a president will likely be diluted by the popularly elected lower chamber. Moreover, in
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countries that sit in a joint session to vote for the president, the lower chamber has enough votes
to ignore the influence of the second chamber. For example, when the Swiss legislature sits in joint
session, the lower chamber outnumbers the upper chamber 200 to 46 seats. If the lower chamber
is dominated by one party, the upper chamber is rendered useless in the executive selection
process.
The Ethiopian presidential appointment process further limits the upper chamber's
influence by requiring the lower chamber to select potential candidates for the electoral college to
vote on. By doing this, the lower chamber eliminates the risk of the upper chamber nominating a
candidate they find politically unpopular. Thus, the Ethiopian upper chamber has no say in picking
a presidential candidate and is left to vote for which candidate they dislike the least.
Ultimately, allowing bicameral legislatures to select one or more executives can increase
regional representation and provide skilled politicians the opportunity to choose a qualified
executive that appeals to a large portion of a state's minority groups. However, to see the benefits
of a bicameral legislature in the executive selection process, a state must design its constitution to
allow the upper chamber meaningful influence in selecting an actual decision-maker. One
characteristic of a bicameral system that might indicate an upper chamber does have the necessary
influence to impact an executive selection is the ability for an upper chamber to scrutinize a lower
chambers pick, similar to how an upper chamber carefully examines proposed legislation from the
lower chamber.
During legislative drafting, the upper chamber serves as a chamber of review by slowing
down decisions made in the lower chamber. The presence of an upper chamber delays the
legislative procedure and allows the expression of public sentiments on policy issues. Thus, the
upper chamber assists in creating high-quality legislation. Applying the bicameral principle of
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review to the executive selection process would hopefully result in a higher quality of executive.
In practice, this may look like an upper house veto to the lower chamber's executive selection or a
dual executive system that allows the upper chamber to select its own executive whose power
rivals that of the lower chamber's executive. Therefore, granting the upper chamber in a bicameral
legislature influence in selecting one or more executives can increase minority groups'
representation in the executive branch. However, the constitutional system must be designed to
provide the upper chamber with actual influence in the executive selection process.
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